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Abstract—Multiuser diversity gains can be achieved by assign-
ing channels to users with better channel quality in multiuser
systems. To avoid the extensive information exchange required
for centralized approaches, we propose a distributed fair pricing
strategy for a slotted Aloha system in which users act selﬁshly
to improve their own utilities for both the collision model and
the multipacket reception (MPR) model. Based on a game-
theoretic framework, we show that multiuser diversity gains can
be achieved by appropriately designing the Nash equilibrium
thresholds for the selﬁsh users to preserve the throughput and
revenue achieved in the classical slotted Aloha systems. The
network enforces fairness among different users by employing
a pricing policy that favors equal access probabilities. Our
simulation results show that signiﬁcant multiuser diversity gains
are achieved in terms of energy consumption and/or spectral
efﬁciency.
Index Terms—
I. INTRODUCTION
A
Fundamental characteristic of wireless mobile communi-
cation systems is random channel fading. Traditionally,
diversities in the time, space, and frequency domains are
exploited to combat the detrimental effects of channel fading.
However, instead of mitigating fading on each user’s channel,
multiuser diversity has been proposed to maximize the total
information-theoretic capacity in the context of multiuser
communications [1] [2]. The basic idea of multiuser diver-
sity is to exploit the randomness of fading channels among
different users. The larger the dynamic range of channel
ﬂuctuations and the number of users, the larger the available
multiuser diversity gain is. In a centralized downlink system,
the access point assigns the channel to the user with the
best instantaneous channel gain as in [1] and [3]. However,
centralized scheduling schemes require signiﬁcant information
exchange between users and the access point. Consequently,
a distributed access scheme which reduces this information
exchange but can still utilize the multiuser diversity is very
desirable. In [4], a distributed channel-aware slotted Aloha
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scheme is proposed in which each user utilizes only his
own channel information and assumes that users behave in
a predictable manner which is set by the network. However,
we note that in a distributed system, users may act selﬁshly
to maximize their own performance.
In this paper, we use a game-theoretic approach to design
the pricing-based medium access control (MAC) algorithm to
obtain multiuser diversity gains while preserving the optimum
throughput and revenue that can be achieved in a centralized
network. A fair pricing strategy is imposed to regulate the
overall network performance. Fairness implies the constraint
of an equal access probability. This pricing-based design
motivates all selﬁsh users to cooperate with each other.
Game-theoretic formulations for analyzing MAC protocols
in the presence of selﬁsh users that seek to maximize their
own performance [5]–[10], and in particular for slotted Aloha
[11]–[13], were recently proposed in the literature. The results
in [11] and [13] showed that a distributed Aloha-based MAC
protocol for selﬁsh users is viable and stable. However, the
throughput obtained from [11] [13] is lower than that of a
centrally-controlled Aloha. Motivated by [11], in our previous
work [12], we showed that by enforcing cooperation through
pricing mechanisms, the throughput of the centralized slotted
Aloha can be achieved in a distributed network in which
selﬁsh users access the network attempting to maximize their
own utility. However, our proposed MAC schemes in [12]
do not achieve multiuser diversity gains. To the best of our
knowledge, none of the previously-proposed game-theoretic
formulations for MAC algorithms have considered multiuser
diversity as a tool to enhance the performance. In this paper,
we propose a new game model which associates the channel
characteristics with the transmission costs to achieve multiuser
diversity gains. As opposed to our previous approach in
[12], where we determined a Nash equilibrium transmission
probability, here we design a Nash equilibrium threshold that
takes into account statistical channel characteristics. Each user
decides whether to transmit or wait by comparing his trans-
mission cost with the Nash threshold. We consider two differ-
ent optimization criteria for our MAC algorithm: throughput
and revenue maximization, and we impose an equal access
probability solution to enforce fairness. We further extend our
model to consider multipacket reception (MPR) capabilities at
the physical layer.
Both theoretical and simulation results show that the pricing
model proposed in this paper leads to a distributed MAC
algorithm that consumes less energy and achieves a higher
spectral efﬁciency.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, a game-
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theoretic formulation for exploiting multiuser diversity is pro-
posed. The analysis of the Nash equilibrium for the collision
and MPR channel models are presented in Section III and
Section IV, respectively. Simulation results are discussed in
Section V and conclusions are presented in Section VI.
II. GAME MODEL FOR EXPLOITING MULTIUSER DIVERSITY
GAINS
In this section, we present a game-theoretic model for
a distributed slotted system. We assume that all users can
estimate their own channel characteristics by listening to a
periodically-transmitted beacon signal from the base station
(see also [4]).
Each slot of the system is a one-stage game1.A tt h e
beginning of each slot, all users learn the current state of the
game—- the number of users (N) who currently have packets
to send (active users) and their own channel characteristics.
We note that, in practical systems, the number of active users
can be estimated using the Pseudo-Bayesian Aloha algorithm
in [14]. In this paper, we investigate the scenario where all
users always have data to transmit (high-load systems), i.e. all
users are active users. Each of these users performs one of
the two possible actions: transmit (T)o rw a i t( W). When a
user transmits, its transmission can either succeed (S)o rf a i l
(F). The gain associated with a successful transmission is a
normalized throughput of 1, while the cost2 of transmission
for user i is ci, and the network’s current charge for the
successful packet of user i is μi.I fu s e ri transmits and
succeeds in a given slot, then that user will receive a payoff
of (1 − ci − μi) for that slot (throughput − cost − price
paid). If the user refrains from transmission in a particular
slot (waits), this will result in one slot delay for that user. We
propose a generalized payoff function for the waiting cost, i.e.,
υ(ci,μ i,b), which is a function of ci, μi and a constant delay
cost b.I fu s e ri transmits but fails, it will incur a transmission
cost ci as well as a one-slot delay, but it will not pay for
the transmission (we assume that a user is charged only for
successful transmissions). Therefore, the payoff of this user
in this case can be deﬁned as −υ(ci,μ i,b)) − ci. The payoff
function for user i is summarized as
Payoﬀ =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1 − ci − μi,T and S
−υ(ci,μ i,b),W
−ci − υ(ci,μ i,b),T but F
. (1)
In this paper, we associate this delay with the loss of the
throughput the user could have achieved if it transmitted and
succeeded. Thus, the payoff for this waiting user i can be
calculated as −(1−ci−μi) (the negative of the payoff it could
have achieved if successful) and vi =1− ci − μi. Therefore,
the payoff for the users who transmit but fail becomes −1+μi.
1In this paper, only the one-slot payoff function is considered. Note that
one slot may include many symbols depending on how fast the channels
vary. Thus, this one-slot payoff function can still reﬂect a realistic objective
function, e.g., throughput. Extensions to multi-slot payoff function will be
investigated in our future work.
2The transmission cost in this paper remains constant long enough for the
relative transmission frequencies to stabilize.
Thus, the payoff function for user i is changed into
Payoﬀ =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1 − ci − μi,T and S
−(1 − ci − μi),W
−1+μi,T but F
. (2)
Note that this cost model assumes that users utilize the system
resources aggressively. They value an opportunity to send
since they believe that if they would have sent the packet,
they would have been successful in their transmission. For this
reason, the waiting cost for these users is assumed to be only
associated with the payoff for the case the users successfully
access the network. Note that there could be other payoff
functions for the waiting users to satisfy different QoS. We
have given another model in [15] , which includes a constant
cost penalty for waiting deﬁned for delay-tolerant services.
We have shown in [15] that similar game-theoretic analysis
can be used, and also similar multi-user diversity gains can
be achieved.
It is important to note that the transmission cost ci should
be a normalized function in the range of (0,1) and is related
to the transmission energy cost. In wireless systems, channels
change from one slot to another. The higher the channel power
gain, the lower the transmission power (hence transmission
cost) required to achieve the same spectral efﬁciency. Thus,
the transmission cost should be deﬁned as a monotonically-
decreasing function of the channel power gains.
III. EQUILIBRIA FOR THE COLLISION MODEL
In this section, we consider the classical collision model,
for which a transmission is considered to be successful only
when a single user transmits. Let si be the strategy taken by
user i and si ∈{ T,W}. Thus, the payoff function of user i in
(2) can be written as a function of the strategies of all users,
i.e.,
Payoﬀ of user i
=
⎧
⎨
⎩
1 − ci − µi,s i = T,sj = W for all j  = i
−(1 − ci − µi),s i = W,sj=i = {T,W}
−1+µi,s i = T,sj = T for at least one j  = i
.
(3)
In this paper, we consider a fair game model where all
users access the system with the same probability p. Then,
the expected payoff user i gets from selecting action T is
Ui(T)=Ui(si = T,s−i)
=( −1+μi)
 
1 − (1 − p)
N−1 
+( 1− ci − μi)(1 − p)
N−1,
(4)
where s−i = sj =i. The expected payoff user i gets with action
W is
Ui(W)=Ui(si = W,s−i)=−(1 − ci − μi). (5)
In [12], a nondegenerate mixed strategy equilibrium from (4)
and (5) is obtained using the indifference principle. However,
this mixed strategy equilibrium cannot achieve multiuser di-
versity gains. In this paper, our goal is to optimize the system
performance by appropriately selecting the price μi, according
to the transmission costs {ci,i=1 ,···,N} of the users, so
that each user can achieve its maximum expected payoff by
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of T is larger than W, then the user transmits, otherwise, he
waits. Then, the Nash equilibrium can be deﬁned as follows:
A Nash equilibrium strategy for the set of N players will
be a proﬁle of strategies (s∗
1,...,s∗
N), where s∗
i ∈{ T,W},
i =1 ,2,...,N such that for any player i, ∀s 
i ∈{ T,W},
s 
i  = s∗
i, Ui(s∗
i,s ∗
−i) ≥ Ui(s 
i,s ∗
−i),w h e r es∗
−i = s∗
j =i, j =
1,2,...,N.
Note that Ui(.) represents the expected payoff deﬁned in
(4) and (5), and accounts for the mixed equilibrium strategies
of the other players. This equilibrium changes from one slot
to another as the transmission costs change.
To maximize its own expected payoff, a user will take an
action T when Ui(T) ≥ Ui(W), otherwise, it will wait. From
(4) and (5), we can obtain
Ui(T) ≥ Ui(W) ⇒ ci ≤
2(1 − μi)(1 − p)N−1
1+( 1− p)N−1 . (6)
We deﬁne
τi =
2(1 − μi)(1 − p)N−1
1+( 1− p)N−1 , (7)
where τi is called the equilibrium threshold, and we can
obtain
ci ≤ τi, (8)
and
μi =1−
τi + τi(1 − p)N−1
2(1 − p)N−1 . (9)
Note that each user estimates his channel power gain through
a periodically-transmitted beacon signal and learns the best
strategy periodically by comparing the transmission cost ci
(which is a function of channel power gain) with the equi-
librium threshold τi.O n c eτi is obtained, each user can
decide whether it should transmit or not. Consequently, the
problem of ﬁnding a Nash equilibrium strategy is reduced
to the problem of ﬁnding an equilibrium threshold. Users
whose transmission costs are smaller than their corresponding
equilibrium thresholds will transmit their packets during this
time slot.
Now, let us analyze the relationship among τi, p and μi.
Since p is the probability that a user transmits, we have
p = P{Ui(T) ≥ Ui(W)} = P{ci ≤ τi}. (10)
Let Fci(.) denote the cumulative probability distribution
function (CDF) of ci.T h e n
Fci(τi)=P{ci <τ i}. (11)
From (10) and (9), we can obtain
p = Fci(τi), (12)
τi = F−1
ci (p), (13)
and
μi =1−
F−1
ci (p)+F−1
ci (p)(1 − p)N−1
2(1 − p)N−1 . (14)
Case Study:
Let Gi denote the channel power gain of the i-th user and
Fi(.) denote the CDF of Gi. We deﬁne the transmission cost
to be ci =1− Fi(Gi). This deﬁnition preserves the required
properties for ci, i.e., normalization and monotonic decrease
with the increased channel power gains.
Note that there may be some other deﬁnitions of ci which
satisfy the required properties. Our deﬁnition simpliﬁes the
theoretical analysis. Substituting ci =1− Fi(Gi) into (11),
we obtain
Fci(τi)=P{1 − Fi(Gi) <τ i} = P{Gi >F
−1
i (1 − τi)}
=1− Fi{F
−1
i (1 − τi)} = τi.
(15)
From (12), we obtain
τi = p, i =1 ,2,...,N. (16)
Substituting (16) into (9) gives
μi =1−
p + p(1 − p)N−1
2(1 − p)N−1  μ, i =1 ,2,...,N. (17)
It is interesting to note that the equilibrium threshold is
the same as the transmission probability p, which is decided
by the price μi (from (17)) charged by the network. Note
that p is the same for all the users. Since μ is a decreasing
function of p, to obtain a larger p, the network needs to reduce
pricing. In turn, the transmission probability will inﬂuence the
achievable network throughput, and in combination with the
pricing scheme, the revenue of the network provider.
Since the classical collision channel model is considered
in this section, the transmission is successful only if there
is exactly one user whose transmission cost is smaller than
the equilibrium threshold. Since the successful user is the
only one attempting transmission, according to our Nash
equilibrium threshold design, it must be the user with the
lowest transmission cost.
• In homogeneous systems, all users have the same statis-
tical channel characteristics so that {Fi} is the same for
all users. The lowest transmission cost is thus incurred
at the highest channel power gain so that the successful
user must be the one with the largest channel power gain
and thus the multiuser diversity gain is achieved.
• In heterogeneous systems, different users have different
statistical channel characteristics. For two types of users
with different statistical channel characteristics, a lower
transmission cost is not necessarily caused by a higher
channel power gain. Therefore, the successful user must
be the one with the lowest transmission cost but may not
necessarily be the one with the highest channel power
gain. However, since the user with the lowest transmis-
sion cost must have the largest channel power gain among
all the users having the same type of statistical channel
characteristics, the multiuser diversity gain can still be
achieved among the users of the same type.
In the following, we will optimize the pricing scheme, given
the two above-mentioned criteria: throughput and revenue.
A. Throughput Optimization
This subsection describes how the network adjusts pricing
to achieve the maximum throughput. It is well known that the
network throughput S of a slotted Aloha system is
S = Np(1 − p)N−1 (18)4 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS, VOL. XX, NO. XX, JULY 2008
and the maximum throughput is achieved when p =1 /N
[14]. To obtain the same maximum throughput, we set the
transmission probability to p =1 /N. Therefore, from (14),
the optimal pricing to maximize the throughput is
μi =1−
F−1
ci ( 1
N)+F−1
ci ( 1
N)(1 − 1
N)N−1
2(1 − 1
N)N−1 , (19)
and the equilibrium threshold is
τi = F−1
ci (
1
N
). (20)
Case Study ci =1− Fi(Gi):
From (16) and (17), we obtain that
μ = μi =1−
1
N + 1
N(1 − 1
N)N−1
2(1 − 1
N)N−1 ,i =1 ,2,...,N (21)
and the equilibrium threshold is
τi = p =
1
N
,i =1 ,2,...,N. (22)
At ﬁrst glance, it may seem that pricing does not have any
effect on the performance since the equilibrium threshold is
equal to 1
N. However, without pricing, i.e. μi =0 , from (7)
we have
p = τi =
2(1 − p)N−1
1+( 1− p)N−1. (23)
The numerical solutions of (23) for different numbers of users,
are given in Fig. 1. a, where it can be seen that the thresholds
obtained without pricing from (23) are different from our
proposed pricing solutions which maximize the throughput
(τ = 1
N, the curve denoted as ‘Throughput optimization’).
Thus, by introducing pricing, the network can regulate the
overall network behavior.
The pricing μ is monotonically increasing with the number
of users as shown in Fig. 1. b (the curve denoted as ‘Through-
put optimization’). This result is intuitively appealing, since
the network should reduce its charging price to encourage
users to transmit when there are only few users in the system.
When N =1 , there is only one user in the system. In this
case, μ =0and τ =1so that this user is always transmitting
data. For the extreme case of N = ∞, μ =1and τ =0
and no user will try to transmit since there will always be
collisions.
B. Revenue Optimization
In the previous subsection, the network decides the price
aiming to maximize the throughput of the whole network.
In this subsection, we consider a more realistic objective for
the service provider which is to maximize revenue. Assume
that the network only charges for successful transmissions. To
achieve fairness, the transmission probabilities for all users
are enforced to be the same and hence the revenue for the
network is given by
R =
N  
i=1
μip(1 − p)
N−1. (24)
Substituting μi given in (14) into (24), we obtain
R =
N  
i=1
(1 −
F−1
ci (p)+F−1
ci (p)(1 − p)N−1
2(1 − p)N−1 )p(1 − p)N−1.
(25)
The optimum p which maximizes R can be obtained by setting
the derivative of (25) to zero.
Case Study ci =1− Fi(Gi):
Substituting (17) into (24), we obtain
R =( 1−
p + p(1 − p)N−1
2(1 − p)N−1 )Np(1 − p)N−1. (26)
The closed-form solution for the optimum p is analytically
intractable. However, several optimization software packages
can be used to compute the numerical solutions, such as
the fminsearch function in MATLAB. After we obtain the
optimum solution, the price μ can be obtained from (17) and
the equilibrium threshold can be obtained from (16).
Next, we will investigate the relationship between these two
criteria. It is well-known from the centrally-controlled slotted
Aloha protocol that S = Np(1−p)N−1 is a strictly-increasing
function over p when p< 1
N, and a strictly-decreasing
function when p> 1
N [14]. The maximum S is achieved
at p = 1
N. From (17), it can be seen that μ is a decreasing
function of p. Therefore, the optimum p maximizing R must
be no larger than the optimum p maximizing S since R = μS.
Then, the optimum pricing for the revenue optimization should
be no smaller than the optimum pricing for the throughput
optimization. We can see these facts from the thresholds and
pricing comparisons in Fig. 1. a and Fig. 1. b, respectively.
Another observation we notice from Fig. 1. b is that μ<1.
Thus, when a user transmits but fails, the expected payoff
becomes negative, i.e. −1+μi < 0. However, the expected
payoff of waiting (−(1−ci−μi)) may be positive depending
on the transmission cost since the larger the transmission
cost, the larger the expected payoff of waiting. In fact, if
the transmission cost is high, e.g., ci > 1 − μi, the expected
payoff of waiting is positive and the payoffs for T and S
can even become negative. Consequently, this user would
like to wait rather than transmit and the resulting average
expected payoff is still positive as shown in the simulation
section. This observation reinforces our explanation regarding
the possibility of achieving multiuser diversity.
IV. EQUILIBRIA FOR THE MULTIPACKET RECEPTION
MODEL
In the previous section, we analyzed the fundamental colli-
sion model, for which two simultaneously-transmitted packets
always collide and are assumed lost. However, enhancements
at the physical layer (e.g., beamforming, spatial diversity, mul-
tiuser detection, etc.) result in multipacket reception (MPR)
capabilities, i.e., more packets may be successfully received
simultaneously. In this section, we use the game model pre-
sented in Section II to analyze the MPR channels. We have
adopted the analysis model in [13] and [16]. The channel isD. WANG et al.: A GAME-THEORETIC APPROACH FOR EXPLOITING MULTIUSER DIVERSITY IN COOPERATIVE SLOTTED ALOHA 5
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Fig. 1. Threshold and pricing comparison for the collision model
described by an MPR matrix
B =
⎡
⎢
⎢ ⎢
⎢
⎣
ρ10 ρ11 00 ··· 0 ···
ρ20 ρ21 ρ22 0 ··· 0 ···
··· ··· ··· ··· ··· ··· ···
ρn0 ρn1 ρn2 ··· ρnn 0 ···
··· ··· ··· ··· ··· ··· ···
⎤
⎥
⎥ ⎥
⎥
⎦
, (27)
where ρnl denotes the probability that l packets are suc-
cessfully received in a slot where n packets are transmitted.
Similar to [13], the expected number of successes in a total
of n transmissions is given by
rn =
n  
l=0
lρnl. (28)
Let bp(n,k)=
 
n
k
 
pk(1 − p)n−k be the probability of k
packets transmitted out of n packets, where p is the equilib-
rium transmission probability for all the players. Similar to
the Aloha game for the collision model, a Nash equilibrium
threshold exists for this ﬁnite strategy form game. We derive
the equilibrium strategy in a similar fashion as before.
The expected payoff for transmission is
Ui(T)=( 1− ci − μi)
 
N  
k=1
bp(N − 1,k− 1)
rk
k
 
+( −1+μi)
 
1 −
N  
k=1
bp(N − 1,k− 1)
rk
k
 
.
(29)
The expected payoff for waiting is
Ui(W)=−(1 − ci − μi). (30)
Similar to the collision model, if Ui(T) ≥ Ui(W), the player
will transmit, otherwise, it will wait. Since
Ui(T) ≥ Ui(W) ⇒ ci
≤
2(1 − μi)
  N
k=1 bp(N − 1,k− 1)
rk
k
 
1+
 N
k=1 bp(N − 1,k− 1)rk
k
, (31)
the Nash equilibrium threshold τi is deﬁned as
τi =
2(1 − μi)
  N
k=1 bp(N − 1,k− 1)
rk
k
 
1+
 N
k=1 bp(N − 1,k− 1)
rk
k
. (32)
It can be easily seen that the derivation of the relationship
among τi and p in Section III is also true for the multipacket
model. Thus, substituting (13) into (32), we get
μi =1−
F−1
ci (p)+F−1
ci (p)
 N
k=1 bp(N − 1,k− 1)rk
k
2
 N
k=1 bp(N − 1,k− 1)
rk
k
(33)
Let
α =
N  
k=1
bp(N − 1,k− 1)
rk
k
. (34)
When N is very large and p is very small, let γ = Np and
use the Poisson approximation 3 to (34) to obtain
α ∼ =
N  
k=1
e−ˆ γˆ γk−1rk
k!
. (35)
Thus,
μi =1−
F−1
ci (p)+F−1
ci (p)α
2α
=1−
F−1
ci (
γ
N)+F−1
ci (
γ
N)α
2α
.
(36)
Let ˆ γ denote the solution of (36). According to [13], the
system is stable if
λ<e −ˆ γ
∞  
k=1
ˆ γk
k!
rk, (37)
where λ is the arrival rate of the selﬁsh users. For the slotted
Aloha with MPR model, the authors in [16] showed that
stability is achieved if
λ<supx≥0e
−x
∞  
k=1
xk
k!
rk. (38)
If there is a value of x>0 achieving this supremum, then
there exists a ˆ γ = x, and thus an equilibrium threshold τi =
F−1
ci ( x
N) that achieves the maximum throughput.Viewing (36)
as an equation in γ, we ﬁnd that different pricing μi results
in different ˆ γ. Therefore, the network operator can adjust the
pricing μi =1−
F
−1
ci ( x
N )+F
−1
ci ( x
N )α
2α to make ˆ γ = x.
Similar to the analysis of the collision model, we know from
(31) that users with lower transmission costs will transmit so
that the multiuser diversity gains are achieved. Fairness among
all users in heterogeneous systems can be guaranteed by the
enforced equal-access probability.
In the following, we use the capture model in [16] to
investigate the effect of pricing on the random access protocol
to obtain multiuser diversity gains. The MPR matrix can be
3Since we use the Poisson approximation to the binomial distribution, the
obtained results are valid for large N, i.e., N>10.6 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS, VOL. XX, NO. XX, JULY 2008
redeﬁned as
B =
⎡
⎢
⎢ ⎢
⎢
⎣
01 0 0 ··· 0 ···
1 − 1/β2 1/β2 00 ··· 0 ···
··· ··· ··· ··· ··· ··· ···
1 − 1/β2 1/β2 0 ··· 00 ···
··· ··· ··· ··· ··· ··· ···
⎤
⎥
⎥ ⎥
⎥
⎦
,
(39)
so that r1 =1and rk =1 /β2 for k  =1according to
(28) where β is a measure of the packet capture capability
of the system such that smaller β denotes a stronger capture
capability. By substituting r1 =1and rk =1 /β2 for k  =1
into (35) and assuming N is very large we get
α ∼ =
∞  
k=1
e−ˆ γˆ γk−1rk
k!
=
e−ˆ γ(β2ˆ γ − ˆ γ − 1) + 1
β2ˆ γ
, (40)
In what follows, we optimize the network pricing strategy
according to the same two criteria previously discussed:
throughput and revenue maximization.
A. Throughput Optimization
In this subsection, we use throughput optimization as a
metric. From (38), we know that the optimal throughput is
s = e−ˆ γ
∞  
k=1
ˆ γk
k!
rk. (41)
Substituting (35) into (41), we obtain
s =
∞  
k=1
e−ˆ γˆ γkrk
k!
= αˆ γ. (42)
Since the maximum throughput achieved with the op-
timal decentralized control algorithm is 1/β2 +( 1−
1/β2)e(−β
2/(β
2−1)) [17], the optimum ˆ γ satisﬁes
αˆ γ =1 /β2 +( 1− 1/β2)e−β
2/(β
2−1). (43)
From (43) and (40), we obtain
e−ˆ γ(β2ˆ γ − 1 − ˆ γ)=( β2 − 1)e−β
2/(β
2−1). (44)
It can be seen that ˆ γ =
β
2
β2−1 is the solution of (44). Therefore,
p =
ˆ γ
N
=
β2
N(β2 − 1)
(45)
and
α =
β2 − 1
β4 +
(β2 − 1)2
β4 e
−
β2
β2−1. (46)
Then, from (13), we obtain the equilibrium threshold
τi = F−1
ci (p)=F−1
ci (
β2
N(β2 − 1)
), (47)
and the pricing policy can be obtained from (36).
Case Study ci =1− Fi(Gi):
From (45), (16) and (36), we obtain that
τi = p =
β2
N(β2 − 1)
,i =1 ,2,...,N (48)
and
μi =1−
τi + τiα
2α
=1−
β2
 
β4 +( β2 − 1) + (β2 − 1)2e
−
β2
β2−1
 
2N(β2 − 1)
 
(β2 − 1) + (β2 − 1)2e
−
β2
β2−1
 .
(49)
The equilibrium thresholds and pricing under different values
of the capture parameter β can be seen from Fig. 2 and Fig.
3. Similar to the collision model, the equilibrium threshold
monotonically decreases with the number of users while the
pricing monotonically increases with the number of users.
When β is small, which means the system has stronger capture
capabilities, a reduced pricing is designed by the network so
as to encourage users to transmit. Interestingly, we ﬁnd that
when the number of users is very small, i.e., in a very low-
load system, the service provider even has to pay the user
(i.e., the pricing is negative) to make the system operate at the
maximum throughput. Evidently, the negative pricing would
not happen in practice. Only positive pricing makes sense from
the service provider point of view (even if the system operates
at suboptimal throughput). However, we see a price rebate
phenomenon in real systems, when the network provider tries
to attract more customers to join the network.
B. Revenue Optimization
We now analyze how to select a pricing policy that max-
imizes revenue for the service provider. For N users in the
system, the amount of service provided by the network to each
user is p
 N
k=1
 
bp(N − 1,k− 1)
rk
k
 
. Therefore, the revenue
of the network is
R =
N  
i=1
μip
 
N  
k=1
 
bp(N − 1,k− 1)
rk
k
 
 
. (50)
When N is very large and p is very small, the network revenue
can be determined as
R =
N  
i=1
μipα, (51)
where p =ˆ γ/N, α and μi are given in (40) and (36), respec-
tively. Thus, R becomes a function of ˆ γ and the optimum
ˆ γ can be obtained by setting the derivative of R to zero.
Correspondingly, the equilibrium thresholds and the pricing
can be obtained from ˆ γ.
Case Study ci =1− Fi(Gi):
In this case, (36) becomes
μi =1−
ˆ γ
N
2
−
ˆ γ
N
2α
. (52)
and (51) becomes
R =
e−ˆ γ(β2ˆ γ − ˆ γ − 1)(2N − ˆ γ)+2 N − ˆ γ − ˆ γ2β2
2Nβ2 . (53)
The optimum ˆ γ can be obtained numerically. The corre-
sponding equilibrium thresholds and the pricing are shown
in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3. It can be seen that the thresholds
decrease with the number of users while pricing increasesD. WANG et al.: A GAME-THEORETIC APPROACH FOR EXPLOITING MULTIUSER DIVERSITY IN COOPERATIVE SLOTTED ALOHA 7
with the number of users. Similar to the collision model, the
thresholds of the revenue optimization are smaller than the
thresholds of the throughput optimization while the pricing
of the revenue optimization is larger than the pricing of the
throughput optimization. Different from the throughout opti-
mization where the thresholds and pricing vary signiﬁcantly
with β, the thresholds and pricing vary only slightly with β
for the revenue optimization scenario.
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V. NUMERICAL AND SIMULATION RESULTS
In the previous sections, we described the game model for
our MAC scheme and derived the Nash equilibrium thresholds
for both the collision and MPR models. In this section, both
simulation and numerical results are provided. The simulation
results are obtained from 100,000 independent slots and we
assume a Bit-Error-Rate (BER) requirementof BER=10−5 and
a corresponding Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) requirement of
SNR=15dB. In this section, we investigate the performance of
the special case that ci =1− Fi(Gi). To show the multiuser
diversity gains in the simulation, we will consider two perfor-
mance criteria: spectral efﬁciency and energy consumption,
which are deﬁned as follows.
1) Spectral efﬁciency
The metric of spectral efﬁciency is used to measure how
many bits a user can transmit for a given bandwidth.
Here, a continuous-rate adaptive modulation strategy
is used by exploiting the instantaneous channel power
gains, and the spectral efﬁciency is calculated as [18]
r =l o g 2(1 +
ΓPG i
σ2
i
), (54)
where P is the transmission power, σ2
i is the noise power
and Γ is the SNR gap given by
Γ=−
1.5
ln(5BER)
. (55)
Note that to show the effects of the channel gains on the
number of bits transmitted, we consider a ﬁxed power
P =1in the evaluation of spectral efﬁciency.
2) Energy consumption
The metric of energy consumption is used to evaluate
how much energy is consumed by various users to
achieve a given data rate with the same pre-speciﬁed
BER requirement. Note that the users who transmit but
fail will still consume the same amount of energy as if
they transmitted and succeeded as deﬁned in the game
model in Section II. The difference is that they do not
need to pay anything if their packets are not successfully
received. From (54), we can calculate the power P to
achieve data rate r as
P =
(2r − 1)σ2
i
ΓGi
. (56)
In this simulation, we use the normalized data rate r =1
to evaluate the energy consumption and Γ is deﬁned as
in (55). It can be seen from (56) that the higher the
channel power gain (Gi) of the user, the smaller its
power consumption is.
To simplify the notations for illustration purposes, our pro-
posed game scheme in this paper is denoted as COOP-
MUD-ALOHA, where MUD is for multiuser diversity. We
run simulations and present theoretical results to illustrate
the performance of our new proposed scheme, and compare
the performance results with the following two benchmark
algorithms
• Conventional slotted Aloha (CONV-ALOHA) [14] [17]:
For the collision model, each user transmits with a proba-
bility 1
N ( [14]) irrespective of his channel characteristics.
For the MPR model, the optimal transmit probability in
[17] is adopted, i.e., p =
β
2
N(β2−1).
• MAC scheme proposed in our previous work [12]
(COOP-ALOHA): To make a fair comparison with the
proposed scheme in this paper, we redeﬁne ci from [12]
to be the same as the transmission cost in this paper,
i.e., ci =1− Fi(Gi) (note that in [12], we deﬁne ci
in terms of the fraction of the total battery energy level).
This redeﬁnition of ci does not affect the computed Nash
equilibrium in [12] for the collision model. However,
for the MPR model, the derivations in [12] do not hold
anymore since for the revenue optimization given in [12],
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redeﬁnition, ci is changing with channel power gain.
Consequently, we only compare our scheme with COOP-
ALOHA for the collision model.
In the following two subsections, we present simulation and
numerical results for both the collision and the MPR models.
A. Collision Model
1) System Model: We assume that the channels between
users and the access point are characterized by indepen-
dent fading. The lowpass-equivalent channel gains {hi,i=
1,2,...N} between an arbitrary user i and the access point are
assumed to be independent zero-mean unit-variance circularly-
symmetric complex Gaussian random variables. Consequently,
the channel power gains Gi = |hi|2 (i =1 ,2,...,N) have
exponential distribution with unit mean [19], i.e,
Fi(Gi)=( 1− e−Gi)u(Gi), (57)
where u(Gi) is the unit step function. Correspondingly, the
transmission cost of user i is
ci =1− Fi(Gi)=e−Giu(Gi). (58)
2) Numerical and Simulation Results: F i g s .4 ,5 ,6a n d
7 give the numerical and simulation results for the collision
model. From Figs. 4 and 5, we can see that our simulation
results match very well with our theoretical results which
are calculated from (18) and (24). COOP-MUD-ALOHA
based on throughput optimization achieves almost the same
performance as COOP-MUD-ALOHA based on revenue op-
timization. It is interesting to note that both COOP-ALOHA
and COOP-MUD-ALOHA achieve the same throughput per-
formance for the case of throughput optimization. However, if
revenue is optimized, the revenue obtained for COOP-ALOHA
is much less than that obtained by the COOP-MUD-ALOHA
scheme.
The reason for the above observations is that in COOP-
ALOHA, the price changes with the transmission costs to en-
courage equal-access probability even when the transmission
cost is high. However, in COOP-MUD-ALOHA, the price
remains the same and it is usually higher than the one for
COOP-ALOHA. In COOP-ALOHA, when the transmission
cost of a user is larger, the network tends to reduce the price
of that user to impose the equal-access probability. In contrast,
in COOP-MUD-ALOHA, the successful user is always the
user with the smallest transmission cost. Therefore, most of
the prices in COOP-MUD-ALOHA are higher than the prices
in COOP-ALOHA.
Fig. 6 compares the spectral efﬁciencies of different
schemes. COOP-MUD-ALOHA again achieves much higher
spectral efﬁciency than other schemes for both cases of
throughput optimization and revenue optimization. Fig. 7
compares the energy consumption for different MAC schemes.
It can be seen that COOP-MUD-ALOHA consumes much
less energy compared to both CONV-ALOHA and COOP-
ALOHA.
From the presented simulation results, we can see that
our proposed COOP-MUD-ALOHA achieves much higher
multiuser diversity gains compared with the other schemes
(Figs. 6 and 7), without sacriﬁcing throughput or revenue
(Figs. 4 and 5). In addition, throughput optimization based
COOP-MUD-ALOHA has almost the same performance as
the revenue optimization based COOP-MUD-ALOHA. How-
ever, for COOP-ALOHA in [12], the network must tradeoff
throughput optimization and revenue optimization as shown
in Figs. 4 and 5. The average expected payoff is shown in
Fig. 8. It is clear that the average expected payoff is positive
because of the pricing policy.
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B. Multipacket Reception Model
1) System Model: In this section, we present our simulation
results based on the MPR model in Section III. We assume that
there are N users independently and uniformly distributed in a
circle of radius D whose positions are independent from slot to
slot. Users transmit packets to an access point at the center of
the network. Without loss of generality, we assume that Users
1 and 2 have the strongest and the second strongest received
powers, respectively, among all the users whose packets are
involved in a collision. As in [16], the strongest packet is
correctly received iff G1
G2 >K(K being a system-dependent
constant), and all the other packets involved in the collision are
not received successfully. Let di denote the distance between
user i and the access point. Moreover, assume that the receivedD. WANG et al.: A GAME-THEORETIC APPROACH FOR EXPLOITING MULTIUSER DIVERSITY IN COOPERATIVE SLOTTED ALOHA 9
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power of a packet only depends on the distance di
Gi =
A
dα
i
,α ≥ 2, (59)
where we assume A =1and α =4in our simulation. Then,
there will be capture iff
d2 >β d 1, (60)
where β = K
1
α is the capture parameter, and d1, d2 are the
distances of the closest and the next to closest senders from
the receiver, respectively. In our simulation, we set β2 = 4
3.
The probability density function (pdf) of di is
f(di)=
 
2di
D2 ;0 ≤ di ≤ D
0; otherwise
. (61)
Then, from (59) and (61), we obtain the pdf of the ith user’s
power at the receiver as
fi(Gi)=
⎧
⎨
⎩
2
D2Aα
 
A
Gi
  α+2
α
; Gi ≥ AR−α
0; otherwise
, (62)
and the cumulative probability distribution function (CDF) as
Fi(Gi)=
⎧
⎨
⎩
1 −
 
A
Gi
  2
α
D−2; Gi ≥ AR−α
0; otherwise
. (63)
Thus, the cost function is
ci =1− Fi(Gi)=
 
A
Gi
  2
α
D
−2,G i ≥ AR
−α
=
 
di
D
 2
, 0 ≤ di ≤ D
. (64)
In our simulation, D =1 .
2) Numerical and Simulation Results: Figs. 9, 10, 11, and
12 present the numerical and simulation results for the MPR
model. Figs. 9 and 10 show that the theoretical results match
very well with the simulation results.
Figs. 11 and 12 compare the spectral efﬁciencies and en-
ergy consumptionof differentschemes. COOP-MUD-ALOHA
based on the throughput optimization has almost the same
performance as COOP-MUD-ALOHA based on the revenue
optimization, which is much better than CONV-ALOHA.
From the presented simulation results, we can see that our
proposed COOP-MUD-ALOHA achieves much higher mul-
tiuser diversity gains (Figs. 11 and 12) compared with CONV-
ALOHA, without sacriﬁcing throughput or revenue (Figs. 9
and 10). However, different from the collision model, the
throughput optimization and revenue optimization no longer
yield identical throughput and revenue although the spectral
efﬁciency and the energy consumption are almost the same.
Therefore, there is a trade-off between COOP-MUD-ALOHA
based on throughput optimization and COOP-MUD-ALOHA
based on revenue optimization.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study the problem of designing fair
cooperative MAC schemes that achieve multiuser diversity
gains. Based on a game-theoretic framework, we propose
effective solutions for both the collision and MPR models.
Throughput and revenue are investigated as performance met-
rics for the network. We show that if an appropriate pricing10 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS, VOL. XX, NO. XX, JULY 2008
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is imposed, multiuser diversity gains can be achieved without
sacriﬁcing throughput or revenue for the network. Our results
prove the viability of a distributed MAC implementation in
wireless networks and determine the required policy to enforce
cooperation and fairness in such networks in order to optimize
the overall network performance.
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